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THE EXPUNGEMENT OF ADJUDICATION RECORDS
OF JUVENILE AND ADULT OFFENDERS:
A PROBLEM OF STATUS*
AIDAN R. GOUGH**
Over the past half-century, American correctional law has focused in-
creasingly on the rehabilitation of the individual offender and the develop-
ment of means and practices appropriate to that end.' Realistic appraisal
compels the conclusion that the system of penal law must fulfill a complex
of functions pointed toward a single ultimate goal: the ordering of society
in such a manner that each member has the fullest opportunity to realize
his human dignity through community life.' The law must at once serve
the reconstruction of the offender, the incapacitation of the intractable
criminal, the deterrence of others from criminal conduct, and the exaction
of retribution and expiation for the offense.' (Though often decried in
theory and rather less often disavowed in practice, the punitive aspects of
correctional policy remain an obvious reality.)4 If the offender reoffends,
none of the purposes is served.
It is clear that any program for reform must create the institutions
necessary for its realization, and that the sanctions it imposes must be
functionally apposite to the end it seeks.' There has been surprisingly little
* The author is indebted to Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb of the Harvard Law School
for his helpful commentary on this article.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara.
1. For a critical appraisal see Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Re-
habilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRaM. L., C. & P.S. 226 (1959-60).
2. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LA w 96 (Suther-
land ed. 1956). See also Laswell & Donnelly, The Continuing Debate Over Responsi-
bility- An Introduction to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869, 876
(1959).
3. TAPPAN, CONTEMPORARY CORRECTION 4-13 (1951).
4. The imposition of punishment by the state is frequently justified as the political
counterpart of individual vengeance. Sir James Stephen is quoted as remarking that
"criminal procedure is to resentment what marriage is to affection: namely, the legal
provision for an inevitable impulse of human beings." SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 287 (5th ed. 1955); see BLOCH & GEis, MAN, CRIME, AND
SOCIETY 568-71 (1962).
For an articulation of unconscious motivations operative in our treatment of law-
breakers see Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Imanity Defense'--Why Not?, 72 YALE L.
J. 854, 856 n.ll (1963).
5. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 166 (1964).
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recognition of the fact that our system of penal law is largely flawed in
one of its most basic aspects: it fails to provide accessible or effective means
of fully restoring the social status of the reformed offender. We sentence,
we coerce, we incarcerate, we counsel, we grant probation and parole,
and we treat-not infrequently with success-but we never forgive.6 The
late Paul Tappan has observed that when the juvenile or adult offender
has "paid his debt to society," he "neither receives a receipt nor is free of
his account."' His status is that of "ex-offender"m-an anomalous position
lying somewhere between the poles of social acceptance and social con-
demnation, though obviously closer to the latter. There is considerable
evidence to indicate that the failure of the criminal law to clarify the
status of the reformed offender impedes the objective of reintegrating him
with the society from which he has become estranged." The more heavily
he bears the mark of his former offense, the more likely he is to reoffend.
Despite relatively widespread judicial recognition of the perdurability
and disabling effects of a criminal record,9 scant attention has been given
by lawmakers and behavioral scientists to means whereby the law might in
a proper case relieve the first offender or juvenile miscreant from this
handicap. In recent years, a handful of jurisdictions have enacted legisla-
tion allowing the expungement of an adjudication record of a juvenile or
a conviction record of an adult first offender. This paper will attempt to
6. RUBIN, WEIHOFEN, EDWARDS & ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL COR-
RECTION 694 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN et al.].
7. Tappan, Loss and Restoration of the Civil Rights of Offenders, in NATIONAL
PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION 1952 YEARBOOK 86, 87.
Professors Schwartz and Skolnick have shown that conviction works a degradation
of status which "continues to operate after the time when, according to the generalized
theory of justice underlying punishment in our society, the individual's 'debt' has been
paid." Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 133,
136 (1962). Aaron Nussbaum, Assistant District Attorney of Kings County (New
York), has written that "a theory of law which withholds the finality of forgiveness after
punishment is ended is as indefensible in logic as it is on moral grounds." NUSSBAUI,
FIRST OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 24 (1956).
8. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J 543 (1960).
9. E.g., United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955);
cf. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting).
Of course the record of a conviction for a serious crime is often a lifelong handicap.
There are a dozen ways in which even a person who has reformed, never of-
fended again, and constantly endeavored to lead an upright life may be prejudiced
thereby. The stain on his reputation may at any time threaten his social standing
or affect his job opportunities ... . Id. at 519.
On the effect of juvenile court adjudication see In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787,
789-90, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952); Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42,
38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946).
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survey the need for such legislation, to examine existing and proposed
statutes on both adult and juvenile court levels, and to make some evalua-
tion of their effectiveness. It is the writer's view that providing institutional
means of restoring status after reformation is an appropriate way to har-
monize "the sanctioning activities of the democratic body politic with the
ultimate value-human dignity."'"
At the outset, it is necessary to limn with some particularity what ex-
pungement is and what it is not. By an expungement statute is meant a
legislative provision for the eradication of a record of conviction or ad-
judication upon fulfillment of prescribed conditions, usually the successful
discharge of the offender from probation and the passage of a period of
time without further offense. It is not simply a lifting of disabilities at-
tendant upon conviction and a restoration of civil rights, though this is a
significant part of its effect." It is rather a redefinition of status, a process
of erasing the legal event of conviction or adjudication, and thereby re-
storing to the regenerate offender his status quo ante.
The systematic study of expungement acts is hindered by the extreme
lack of uniform terminology, even within a single jurisdiction. The func-
tional process of deleting the adjudication of guilt upon proof of reformation
is variously designated expungement;" record sealing; record destruc-
tion;" obliteration;" setting aside of conviction; 6 annulment of convic-
10. Laswell & Donnelly, supra note 2, at 876.
11. Civil rights lost on conviction are usually regained, if at all, by pardon or by
statutes providing automatic restoration upon completion of sentence. Extensive
analysis of these restorative mechanisms will be found in RUBIN et al. 613, 632; RUBIN,
CRIME & JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 152 (2d ed. 1961); Tappan, supra note 7, at 96-104.
For a thorough discussion of the particular disabilities attendant upon conviction
see Green, Post-Conviction Disabilities Imposed or Authorized by Law, 1960 (unpub-
lished honor paper on file in Harvard Law Library).
12. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 781; UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-117 (Supp.
1965).
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.45; CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 781. Technically,
expungement imports physical destruction of the records rather than sealing. Andrews
v. Police Court, 123 P.2d 128 (Cal. App. 1942), aff'd, 21 Cal. 2d 479, 133 P.2d 398
(1943); 40 CAL. Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. 50 (1962). As used in this paper, the term ex-
pungement includes both destruction and sealing unless otherwise specified.
14. IND. ANN. SrAT. § 9-3215a (1956).
15. Ibid.
16. Mica. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.1274(101), (102) (Supp. 1965). Statutes permitting
the setting aside of convictions are not true expungement acts, and have much more
limited effect than the latter. See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra. The Michigan
enactment would appear to be of the former type, save for the provision of § 28.1274
(102) that upon entry of an order setting aside a conviction, the person "for purposes
of the law" shall be deemed not to have suffered any previous conviction. Because of
its uncertain scope and the possibility that the broad language may reach the status of
the conviction, it is included here as an expungement act, albeit a deficient one.
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tion; 7 amnesty; 8 nullification of conviction, purging, and pardon extra-
ordinary. 9 Because many of these terms have wider use in other legal
contexts, it is suggested that the term expungement be adopted to avoid
confusion.
In particular, the usual denotations of amnesty and pardon must be
distinguished from expungement. The former are exceptional and specific
acts of grace, usually granted by executive power, rather than processes of
regular and widespread application available through legislative provision.2"
Despite confusion engendered by murky decisional language, it seems clear
-and has been widely held-that a pardon remits punishment and re-
moves some disabilities, but does not erase the legal event determinative of
the offender's status qua offender, i.e., the conviction itself.2 It is the status
resulting from the adjudication of guilt, more than any punishment imposed,
which is characteristic of conviction; if the disabilities of conviction are
to be removed effectively and the reformed offender restored to society, the
remedy chosen must reach the genesis of the status.2"
I. AN EXAMINATION OF NEED
The consequences of conviction are wide in form, some authorized ex-
pressly or implicitly by law, others attached by subtle attitudes of com-
munity rejection. Commonly, the law provides for the deprivation or
17. National Council on Crime & Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction ol
Crime: A Model Act, 8 CRms & DELINQUENCY 97 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
N.C.C.D. MODEL ACT].
18. State of N.Y. Ass'y Bill, Int. No. 233 (3d Rdg. 547, Print. 5363, Rec. 703)
(1965).
19. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 242.31, 638.02 (Supp. 1965).
20. KORN & MCCORKLE, CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 600-04 (1959); SUTHERLAND
& CRESSEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 544-49.
21. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914) (state may charge as prior crime
offense pardoned by President); People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937)
(offense in sister state deemed prior conviction despite pardon); In re Lavine, 2 Cal.
2d 324, 329, 41 P.2d 161, 163 (1935) (pardon "implies guilt, and does not wash out
the moral stain" or restore the offender's character); People ex rel. Jobissy v. Murphy,
224 App. Div. 834, 279 N.Y. Supp. 762 (1935); State v. Edelstein, 146 Wash. 221,
62 Pac. 622 (1927). See also Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). For
language to the contrary see Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1867).
On the general history and scope of executive clemency see Weihofen, Effect of a
Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. Rv. 177 (1939); Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28
HARv. L. Rav. 647 (1915). For a discussion of pardon in its modem context see
Lavinsky, Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem Arising in the Terminal
Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 CHrI-KENT L. REv. 13 (1965).
22. RU IN et al. 690. One who has received a pardon must nevertheless disclose his
conviction upon inquiry. 1953 N.J. OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 206.
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suspension of political and civil rights upon conviction of a certain class
of crimes, usually felonies. These explicit disabilities include the loss of
the right to hold any public office or trust, to serve as a juryman, and to
practice various occupations and professions.23 In at least forty-six states,
conviction of crime may serve as a ground for divorce.24 Many of these
disabilities persist beyond the termination of sentence.
Every state and the federal system has some means of restoring civil and
political rights."5 Usually this takes the form of a pardon granted at the dis-
cretion of the governor or the board of pardons appointed by him.26 In
some states, the courts are empowered to restore civil rights." A number
of states provide for the automatic restoration of civil rights either upon
completion of a term of probation or parole or upon termination of a prison
sentence."' Both pardon and automatic restoration revive the more formal
civil rights, but they are unable to remove the stigmatic disabilities attach-
ing in such crucial social areas as employment.29
Some nine states have statutes providing that upon satisfactory com-
pletion of probation and "evidence of reformation," the offender may
petition the court to have his conviction and the plea or verdict of guilty
"set aside"; he is thenceforth released from all "penalties and disabilities"
attendant upon the conviction." The Federal Youth Offender Act contains
23. RuBrN et al. 611-32; Tappan, supra note 7.
24. A tabulation of states which regard conviction as a ground for divorce is con-
tained in Green, op. cit. supra note 11, at 64-66. See also RUBi et al. 614-15.
25. RuBIN et al. 632-37; Green, op. cit. supra note 11, at 75-77.
26. There is wide variation in practices from state to state. For example, Rhode
Island reserves the restoration of civil rights apart from a grant of pardon to the
legislature, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-2 (1956), and Mississippi permits it alter-
natively to the governor or legislature, Miss. CONST. art. 5, § 124; art. 13, § 253 (resto-
ration of suffrage by legislature only); cf. Miss. CODE ANN. § 4004-27 (1956) (governor
may restore civil rights on completion of probation).
27. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 13-1 to -10 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-504,
40-3701 (1955).
28. See the tabulation and discussion in RUBIN et al. 633-34. The archetypal auto-
matic restoration statute appears to be 9 Geo. 4, c. 32, § 3 (1828), which provides that
completion of sentence in case of a felony conviction shall have the same effect as a
pardon ". . . to prevent all doubts respecting the Civil Rights of Persons convicted ..
29. See authorities cited note 23 supra.
30. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4332(i) (1953);
IDAmO CODE ANN. § 19-2604 (Supp. 1965); NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.340 (1959); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-53-18 (1960); TEx. CODE CRIMi. PRoC. ANN. arts. 42.12 § 7, .13 § 7
(1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.95.240
(1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-315 (1957) (statute uses term "parole," but seemingly
refers to probation or "court parole" only). For an invidious use of the Utah statute
see State v. Schreiber, 121 Utah 653, 245 P.2d 222 (1952), where the conviction had
been vacated on the condition that defendant "permanently leave the state on account
Washington University Open Scholarship
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essentially similar provisions applicable to youth offenders; however, under
the federal statute, the issuance of an order setting aside the conviction is
automatic upon the unconditional discharge of the offender before the
expiration of his sentence."1 The effects of such statutes are not entirely
clear, and they have been subjected to interpretations quite at variance
with the post-conviction relief they purport to provide.32 Though the
scope of alleviation provided by them is said to be broader than that
provided by pardon,3" they are clearly not statutes of expungement and
do not in fact restore the offender's former status among his fellow men,
despite some judicial language to that effect.34
of his ill health." MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6(2) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) permits
discretionary vacation of conviction if the offender is discharged from probation or
parole before expiration of the maximum term, or if he has led a law-abiding life for five
years after expiration of sentence.
CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE §§ 1179, 1772 provide that a person honorably dis-
charged from the control of the Youth Authority shall be released from all penalties
and disabilities resulting from the offense. Section 1179 operates automatically, while
§ 1772 requires the discharged offender to petition the court for relief, which may be
denied. The apparent overlap of the two sections is not clarified by the statutory lan-
guage, but it is the interpretation of the Youth Authority that § 1179 applies only to
juvenile court commitments and § 1772 only to commitments from criminal courts.
Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 816, 821 (1965).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.05(3) allows vacation of the conviction of a young adult
offender as an alternative to providing that his conviction shall not constitute a disability.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1964).
32. For example, note the interpretation of CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 in Garcia-
Gonzales v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 840 (1965). Despite the language of the statute that the setting aside of the
guilty plea and the dismissal of the information "shall . . .[release the petitioner] from
all penalties and disabilities . . .," the court ruled that the conviction was not expunged
for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1964), authorizing deportation of an alien convicted of
a narcotics offense. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1964) was similarly treated in Hernandez-
Valensuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962). See Adams v. United States,
299 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1962) (discusses CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 1772).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1964) acts to "expunge the conviction" while pardon only
removes disabilities and restores civil rights. Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854,
856 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1962). But see 1957 N.J. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 143 (expungement of
record has less effect than a pardon).
34. If the conditions of probation are fulfilled, the plea or verdict of guilty may
be changed ... [and] the proceedings expunged from the record .... He has then
... received a statutory rehabilitation and a reinstatement to his former status in
society insofar as the state by legislation is able to do so .... Stephens v. Toomey,
51 Cal. 2d 864, 870-71, 338 P.2d 182, 185 (1959) (dictum).
Contra, In the Matter of Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 61, 109 P.2d 344, 348 (1941).
[I]t cannot be assumed that the legislature intended that such action by the trial
court under [Penal Code] section 1203.4 should be considered as obliterating the
fact that the defendant had been finally adjudged guilty of a crime.
The Phillips case involved a lawyer disbarred upon conviction of a misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude; the court held that relief under CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 did
not work reinstatement. It is not entirely clear whether the decision turned upon the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss2/2
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It is not the explicitly articulated disabilities which are most trouble-
some to the reformed offender. It is rather the less-direct economic and
social reprisals engendered by his brand as an adjudicated criminal. The
vagaries of public sentiment often discriminate against persons with a crimi-
nal past, with very little regard for the severity of the offense, and they
do not frequently distinguish between persons arrested and acquitted or
otherwise released and persons convicted." This is particularly true in
the vital matter of employment, which perhaps as much as anything else
influences a man's concept of himself and his worth, and accordingly in-
fluences the values which guide his conduct.
A recent study found that only eleven per cent of employers who were
seeking to hire were willing to consider a man convicted of assault." Only
one-third would consider a man who had been charged with the same
crime and acquitted. Despite the small sample used (25 employers, of
whom 9 had need of employees), the crippling effects of the stigma ensuing
from criminal adjudication are immediately apparent.
Not only will the offender have trouble finding unskilled employment,
but his difficulty will increase directly with the skill level of the job sought.
In a study of the emplo)ment experiences of 258 men with criminal records,
non-obliteration of the judgment or upon the fact that the court viewed disbarment as
outside the "penalties and disabilities" clause of the statute. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6
(Prop. Official Draft, 1962) provides that the order vacating the conviction does not,
inter alia, preclude proof of conviction whenever relevant to the exercise of official
discretion, nor does it justify a defendant in denying conviction unless he also calls
attention to the order.
35. Cf. RuBIN et at. at 630-31. As a partial solution to the problem, some states
require the destruction of fingerprints and arrest data upon acquittal or discharge
without trial, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 749.2 (1950), or their return to the person
involved, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 206-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964). Often the finger-
prints are not returned unless requested. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 29-15 (1958).
Absent a statute, return or destruction has been denied even when the arrest has been
found patently improper. In Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 696 (1962), a woman was arrested under a city ordinance prohibiting the de-
frauding of a taxicab operator when the driver refused to change a twenty dollar bill.
Despite her judgment against the cab company for false arrest and malicious prosecu-
tion, return of the fingerprints and "mug shots" from police files was denied. See
generally Note, 42 ILL. L. REv. 256 (1947); Note, 27 TEmP. L.Q. 441 (1954); Annot.
83 A.L.R. 127 (1933).
36. Schwartz & Skolnick, supra note 7, at 134-38. In conducting this portion of the
study, the authors prepared four hypothetical application files, which were submitted
to prospective employers by an employment agent. Three of the files reflected an arrest
for assault: the first file showed a conviction and satisfactory completion of sentence,
the second an acquittal, and the third an acquittal with a personal letter from the
judge verifying the finding of not guilty and stressing the legal presumption of innocence.
The fourth file made no mention of any criminal record. All applications were for
lowest-level positions as unskilled laborers.
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the participants were asked whether a criminal record truly handicaps a
person in seeking employment, and whether criminal conduct is stimulated
by discriminatory rejection of those with past records of offense. Ninety-
four per cent of the men replied affirmatively to each question. When the
same questions were put to 223 businessmen, 57% responded affirmatively
to the first query and 84% to the second." Another oft-cited study sur-
veyed 44 business and professional employers: 16% expressed a policy of
total exclusion of persons with any criminal past, while 84% would hire
a former offender for unskilled labor. 8 However, only 64% would con-
sider such a person for a skilled labor position; only 40% for clerical work;
and only 8% for sales jobs. None would consider a person with a record
of criminality for a position as an accountant, cashier, or executive."9 The
principal determinants in the policy of complete exclusion may have
been the assumptions, first, that any former offender was by definition
untrustworthy, and, second, that the engagement of such a person would
undermine the morale of the present employees."0
37. Wallerstein, Testing Opinion of Causes of Crime, 28 Focus 103 (1949), cited
in Tappan, supra note 7, at 89.
38. Melichercik, Employment Problems of Former Offenders, 2 N.P.P.A.J. 43 (1956).
See also RUBIN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 151-54.
39. In the course of several informal interviews with personnel administrators of
companies located on both the east and west coasts, the writer gained the impression
that personnel officers regard the picture given by this study as unrealistic. Most said
that they had no definite policy of exclusion, but wanted full disclosure of the details
of the offense in order to weigh each case "on the merits" and to match the individual
to the job. Several expressed distrust of an expungement procedure, and indicated
that they would not look favorably on someone who had invoked it. As one man put
it: "We probably wouldn't fire the guy outright [i.e., in the event of subsequent dis-
covery of the offense], but I think we'd be rather hurt that he didn't feel he could
come and tell us about it."
Administrators of two of the concerns (a major university and a nationwide tem-
porary-help service) indicated that they did not ask the applicant about prior offenses,
but relied exclusively upon the recommendations of former employers. (This would
effectively foreclose those who had been incarcerated and could not "account for
their past.") On the other hand, firms in the electronics field typically made searching
inquiry of all applicants, even those applying for the most menial positions. Presumably,
this practice reflects the companies' concern over security risks, but in some cases the
probing exceeds relevant inquiry. In one firm, an applicant for the position of micro-
wave tube assembler (two dollars/hour) was required to list all arrests or convictions
and give full details, indicate in detail any other "misconduct" with which he or she
had been charged (presumably relating to employment but not clearly), account for all
past absences from work, explain all garnishments or other credit impairment, and sign
an "agreement" that he or she could be immediately discharged without recourse if
any information given was found to be "false or misleading." (Application form in
possession of the author.)
40. Melichercik, supra note 38, at 48-49.
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The ex-offender's chances of employment by public or governmental
agencies--even in the most ordinary positions-are no brighter. One
study has concluded that nearly one-half of the states, and the federal
government, do not automatically exclude a person with an adjudication
of criminal guilt from consideration for public employment.4 ' This is by
no means indicative of the extent of former-offender employment, because
denial of hire usually results from the exercise of administrative discretion
by the examining or certifying agency.42 Only one state expressly provides
that a rehabilitated offender shall not be barred from public employment
by his conviction. Exclusion from employment may result either from
rejection because of a former offense or from dismissal because of the com-
mission of a present offense. Surely these situations are different, and dif-
ferent policies should apply.
It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that the governmental em-
ployers of our nation drop their bars and become a haven for unregenerate
brigands, and no such proposal is put forth here. The public good demands
the utmost probity of its servants. It also demands, however, the reassimila-
tion into full social status of all who have offended against it. The removal
of the stigma of conviction by annulling it upon proof of reform would
open large areas of public employment now closed to the rehabilitated
offender.
It is necessary to differentiate, moreover, among the kinds of positions
sought. This need applies to licensing mechanisms as well as to direct
employment, and in general it is not met. Surely the considerations that
require exclusion of former offenders from law enforcement and public
safety positions do not thrust with the same force in the case of a truck-
driver, or an engineering aide, or a forest firefighter. There are valid and
necessary reasons for permanently foreclosing those with records of violative
conduct from certain critical and highly sensitive positions in the public
service, but surely some account must be taken by the law of the gravity
of the offense, and some reasonable criteria-other than the shopworn
41. RuBIN et al. at 628-30; see Wise, Public Employment of Persons with a Criminal
Record, 6 N.P.P.A.J. 197, 198 (1960). Rubin's figures are based largely upon
Widdifield, The State Convict, 1952 (unpublished doctoral thesis on file at Yale
Law School Library). Variant results were reported by Green in a study conducted in
1960: forty-two states were reported as having no rule completely prohibiting em-
ployment of ex-offenders. However, only twenty-eight states indicated that they did
in fact hire such persons, usually in positions of unskilled labor. Green, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 74. This survey also included a limited inquiry into municipal hiring practices.
Id. at 73.
42. RUBIN et al. at 625, 628.
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 64A, § 19 (1957). The appointing authority may consider
the conviction in granting employment.
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dichotomy of felony and misdemeanor-must be developed." Not infre-
quently the disability of a record for even a single offense bars military
enlistment, though the selection standards vary with the national need for
service manpower.4"
The effects of criminal stigma are felt perhaps even more strongly in
the area of licenses and government-regulated occupations than they are
in the sector of public employment. Green lists some fifty-nine occupations,
from accountancy to yacht selling, in which a license is required and from
which a reformed offender may be barred; his list is only illustrative, not
exhaustive." The relevance of an offense of petty theft to the practice of
the profession or trade may be immediately apparent, as in the practice of
law, or may be recondite in the extreme-if there at all-as in the case of
barbering. Even though the offense may be relevant, this is not to say that
it should be determinative of entry into the trade or profession.
A few years ago, a young man of twenty-one celebrated his college's
basketball victory with more enthusiasm than good sense, and with two
cohorts-all in a happy state of bibulosity-broke into the rear service
porch of a vacant apartment, from which he abstracted a large metal
garbage can. When the police arrived shortly thereafter, he was busily
engaged in rolling it up and down the rear stairs of the apartment, to
the vast annoyance of the building's occupants. His comments to the police
were not of the politest sort. He was arrested on charges of burglary,
malicious mischief, disturbance of the peace, public intoxication, and con-
tributing to the delinquency of minors (his companions were below the
age of twenty-one). The burglary charge was dropped; he pleaded guilty
to the other counts, and was granted probation conditioned upon replace-
44. For discussion on the need for an expungement statute to make some differentia-
tion on the basis of the gravity of the offense and the criticality of the purposes for
which the information is sought see text accompanying notes 132-44 infra.
45. Broadly speaking, persons convicted of felonies are excluded. Major commanders
may grant waivers to persons convicted of lesser offenses if they have been free of all
forms of civil control for at least six months. Adjudicated juvenile and youthful offenders
may be granted waivers by main station commanders, who may delegate their authority
to recruiting main station commanders. The latter may grant waivers for certain
single minor offenses such as drunkenness and truancy. 32 C.F.R. § 571.2(e) (5)
(1962). See generally MacCormick, Defense Department Policy Toward Former Offen-
ders, NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE AssocrATIoN 1951 YEARBOOK 1.
46. Green, op. cit. supra note 11, at 26. For a more enlightened example of statutory
exclusion from occupation see § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964), which bars persons convicted of specified crimes
from holding various positions in labor unions. It should be noted that even in so
"high-risk" an occupation, the ban is not perpetual but extends only five years from con-
viction. The statute recognizes the possibility of reformation.
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ment of the battered garbage can and suitable apologies to its owners. His
probation was satisfactorily completed; he graduated from college, went
on to a large law school, and graduated with honors near the head of his
class. Save for this casual and unfortunate incident, his record is other-
wise without blemish. Would it really make sense to require that for the
rest of his life he be foreclosed from the practice of his profession?" The
labels of "malicious mischief," "disturbance of the peace," "drunk in
public," and "contributing to the delinquency of a minor" (this last par-
ticularly opprobrious and connotative of moral turpitude) are surely not
properly descriptive of his offense, or of his moral character. Yet, he must
bear them the rest of his life, listing them on credit and job applications,
and otherwise having them dredged up in a host of ways.
Should such persons-and no one can estimate successfully how many
there may be-be forced to bear forever the stain of their immature and
impulsive conduct? To take a few examples: someone in the shoes of
this young man, if he were a barber, would likely lose his license in
Michigan or California."5 Apparently, he could not work as a physical
therapist or practice optometry or chiropractic in Minnesota." He could
be denied a license to breed or raise horses or to process or sell horsemeat
in Illinois,5" and might lose his cosmetologist's license in Wisconsin.51 With-
out the aid of an expungement statute, he would be compelled to bear the
mark of his past mistake. Statutes permitting the setting aside of convictions
are no help here ; it is not uncommon for the law to provide that despite
the vacation of conviction under such an act, the conviction may neverthe-
less be considered for licensing and disciplinary purposes. 3
47. This roughly describes a case known to the author. The young man in question
was admitted to the bar examination after giving a full explanation and now enjoys a
successful practice
48. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6576 (disqualification on conviction of crime of moral
turpitude); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.106 (1937) (disqualification upon conviction of
any crime).
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 147.02 (optometrist), 148.10 (chiropractor), 148.75
(physical therapist) (Supp. 1965).
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, § 242.2 (Supp. 1965) (disqualification on convic-
tion of felony or "any crime opposed to decency or morality").
51. WIs. STAT. § 159.14 (1961) (disqualification on conviction of any crime).
52. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
53. See, e.g., exceptions to the stated effect of CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 in CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 1679 (dentists), 2383, 2384 (physicians), 2963 (psychologists),
6102 (attorneys), 6576 (barbers), 10177(b) (real estate brokers), 10302(b) (business
opportunity brokers), 10562(b) (mineral, oil, and gas licensees); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
12910 (teachers); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13555 (revocation of driver's license).
See also Epstein v. California Horse Racing Board, 222 Cal. App. 2d 831, 35 Cal. Rptr.
642 (1963).
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In ways more indirect than employer rejection or legal restriction, the
stigma of a former offense is likely to militate against successful employment
of the redeemed offender. He may be denied union membership, although
apparently no union admits to a hard-and-fast policy of exclusion. More-
over, many positions require bonding as a precondition of hire, and former
offenders are generally not bondable, whatever the relevance of their offense
to the risk covered by the bond. One young man who fights another on
the street over the latter's interference with his lady fair, and who is
convicted of assault and battery or disturbing the peace as a result of his
passions, should not necessarily be marked thereafter as an employment
risk, unworthy of trust. The problem is particularly acute in companies
using low-cost "blanket bonds" which commonly contain provisions void-
ing protection if the employer hires any person with an offense record, at
least without the prior consent of the surety. 4
Similarly, a person with a record of criminal conduct may experience
substantial difficulty in obtaining automobile liability coverage (or in getting
inclusion under his employer's liability policy), and may be foreclosed from
any work requiring the use of a car either in the course of the job or in
getting to and from his place of employment. Alternatively, he may not
be precluded from coverage but may be treated as an "assigned risk,"
whatever his offense." Although this has the advantage of giving the
former offender access to insurance, it has the disadvantage of subjecting
him to perhaps prohibitive expenses at a time when he can least likely
afford them. Further, a person with an arrest or conviction record may in
54. Frequently, it is said that hiring of an offender will void all coverage. See Frym,
The Treatment of Recidivists, 47 J. CRmn. L., C. & P.S. 1 (1956). The following is a
typical liberal "blanket bond" provision:
The coverage of this bond shall not apply to any employee from and after the
time that the Insured or any partner or officer thereof, not in collusion with such
employee, shall have knowledge or information that such employee has committed
any fraudulent or dishonest act in the service of the Insured or otherwise, whether
such act be committed before or after the date of employment by the Insured.
Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees, 21 Fed.
Prob. 36 (1957).
This study suggests that the surety companies may be willing to examine individual
cases and permit the employer to assume the risk himself, and the wording of the bond
would import that the cancellation of protection would apply only to the individual
and not to the concern as a whole. This is preferable to blanket invalidation, but it
nevertheless requires uncommon understanding and effort on the part of the employer
and there is no guarantee that the consent of the surety will be given. The bonding
firms interviewed in the course of Lykke's study felt that their alleged unwillingness to
give coverage was more often than not used as an excuse to mask the employer's hostility
toward hiring persons with an offense record.
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some jurisdictions be denied a vehicle operator's license (or even, appar-
ently, a fishing license)."'
Typically, a former offender who is called as a witness is subject to
impeachment of his credibility on the basis of his prior conviction." This
may be so despite an order "setting aside" or vacating a conviction and
releasing him from "all penalties and disabilities.""8 Once a person has
been cast as an offender, he seems always to be suspect as a liar. 9 Let us
suppose that the young purloiner of garbage cans, whose fate is recounted
above, observes a traffic accident some five years after his conviction and
is asked whether he has pertinent testimony. It is not beyond the bounds
of reason to suppose that he would be strongly tempted to deny that he
had seen anything, that he would do whatever he could to avoid the
witness stand and the possibility of public exposure and humiliation. Last,
but as usual not least, the former offender becomes a target for future
investigation and suspicion. This is simply a fruit of his error, and he
should bear it-up to a point. Unfortunately, that point may be passed,
and the former offender may be subjected to unwarranted harassment
by a law enforcement agency whose standards of courtesy and professional
practice have not caught up with its zeal."' It is not at all unreasonable
for a young man who burglarized a service station one month before to be
quizzed regarding a burglary perpetrated by similar modus operandi at
another station-providing his rights are respected and he is handled with
the courtesy incumbent upon a police officer. It is highly unreasonable for
him to be "rousted" on a service station break-in five years later, when
the events of the interim indicate that he is comporting himself as a law-
abiding citizen.
The point distills to this: should we permanently maintain, as a matter
of social policy, the stigmatic ascriptions of a single adjudication? How
56. See the commentary to the N.C.C.D. MODEL ACT, supra note 17, at 98.
57. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 89-94 (1954). There are very great variations among
the states as to the crimes that will serve as a ground of impeachment.
58. E.g., People v. O'Brand, 92 Cal. App. 2d 752, 207 P.2d 1083 (1949); People
v. James, 40 Cal. App. 2d 740, 105 P.2d 947 (1940). The new California Evidence
Code (to take effect on January 1, 1967) codifies in § 788(d) the dictum of People
v. Mackay, 58 Cal. App. 123, 208 Pac. 135 (1922), that a conviction set aside under
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 cannot be used to impeach unless the person is the de-
fendant in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The present state of the law is by no
means clear, and the Mackay case has been seriously eroded by later holdings; these
cases are discussed in Comment, 2 STAN. L. REV. 222 (1949).
Even under the new California Evidence Code the offender who has erred in a state
lacking a vacation or expungement statute would be open to attack in a California court.
59. Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017 (1965).
60. Id. at 1021.
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long is enough? In the recent case of DeVeau v. Braisted, 1 the Supreme
Court of the United States sidestepped this question in affirming the ex-
clusion of petitioner from the position of secretary-treasurer of a longshore-
man's local under § 8 of the New York Waterfront Commission Act of
1953.2 Petitioner had pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny thirty-five
years before his removal from office and had received a suspended sentence.
Though terming the result "drastic," the Court noted the long history of
abuses on the New York waterfront and upheld the application of the Act.
While one cannot quarrel with the Court's assessment of the "high risk" of
the occupation, one must regret the Court's failure to confront the problem
of how long disqualification resulting from an adjudication of criminal
guilt should endure.6"
It is not for the confirmed recidivist that primary concern about restora-
tion of status is due, but for the first offender-the "accidental" criminal,
if you will-whose violative conduct never reoccurs. Though an accurate
count is impossible, the number of such persons is staggering. Nussbaum
has estimated that in the United States today there are nearly 50,000,000
persons with offense records; he concludes that between 15,000,000 and
20,000,000 are first offenders who do not recidivate." His calculations
are based upon extrapolations from the number of arrests per 100,000
population as determined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reports in 1953 and 1954 (assuming a recidivism rate of 63%),
projected over one generation of 30 years. He places the number of first-
time offenders arrested each year at roughly 1,600,000."
It is beyond the present capacity of the social sciences to verify these
estimates; adequate statistical information is not available. Nussbaum's
61. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
62. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 9933 (McKinney 1961).
63. For a suggestion that the problem is one of due process see Green, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 31-35. It must be remarked that petitioner had not obtained a certificate
of good conduct, N.Y. ExECuTiv LAW. § 242, following his discharge from sentence;
if he had, he would have escaped the bar of § 8. There is no indication that he was
aware of the availability of this relief.
64. NussEAuM, FIRST OFFENDEIS, A SECOND CHANCE 8-11 (1956). The arrest
rate per 100,000 population in 1953 is given as 4,231.6. 1954 FBI UNIFORM Cruzu
R.EP. 52-53 (table 17). The most recent rate (for the year 1963) is shown as 3,460.4.
1964 FBI UNIFORM CaPmE REP. 106-07 (table 18). Frym estimates that there are
10,500,000 persons with offense records exclusive of traffic matters. Frym, supra note
54, at 3. While Nussbaum's estimate seems excessive, Frym's seems too low, in the
light of the F.B.I. figures.
65. NussBAuM, op. cit. supra note 64, at 9. The F.B.I. indicates that 41% of the
arrests reported nationally are of persons under the age of 25. 1964 FBI UNIFORM CRIMsE
REP. 108-09 (table 19) (1,919,641 arrests out of 4,685,080 below age of 25).
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totals may be faulted for assuming too high a recividism rate,6 yet one
study being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicates
that the rate may be as high as 76% in the case of persons who commit
major crimes."' Further, it is apparent that the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation's base figures are not accurate indices of the incidence of crime and
arrest; many police agencies do not report at all, or do so sparsely. The
totals commonly exclude vagrancy, drunkenness, peace disturbance, and
other low-order offenses, and they generally do not include arrests of
juvenile offenders. The imprecision of our count is obvious, but however
imprecise it may be, the conclusion is surely apt that there are millions
of persons in the United States who bear the opprobrium of a criminal
record despite their reformation and avoidance of further crime.
To say that the prevention of crime is served by the resocialization of
the offender is to utter the obvious, and yet the proposition is largely gain-
said by present penal practice. From the nearly impenetrable morass of
conflicting theories regarding the etiology of crime, we may at least-
without pretending causational expertise-extract the common sense prin-
ciple that if a man is permanently marked a criminal outcast, he will be
isolated from social groups whose behavior patterns and values are anti-
criminal. Sutherland and Cressey have stated
When he is effectively ostracized, the criminal has only two alterna-
tives: he may associate with other criminals, among whom he can find
recognition, prestige, and means of further criminality; or he may
become disorganized, psychopathic, or unstable. Our actual practice
is to permit almost all criminals to return to society, in a physical
sense, but to hold them off, make them keep their distance, segregate
them in the midst of the ordinary community.6"
If the offender is to be rehabilitated, two things must be done: he must
be made a part of groups emphasizing values conducive to reform and
law-abiding conduct, and he must concurrently be alienated from groups
whose values are conducive to criminality."8 Neither of these goals is
furthered by the failure of the law to provide means of restoring status.
66. Note 65 supra.
67. 1964 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REP. 26-29. Of a special study group of 92,869
offenders, 76% had a prior arrest record. On the other hand, any statistical measure-
ment of rehabilitation is extremely difficult, because it involves the determination of
a negative factor, that is, the absence of arrest or conviction over a given period of time.
Cf. Glaser, Differential Association and Criminological Prediction, 8 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 6
(1960).
68. SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 318 (5th ed. 1955).
69. Cressey, Changing Criminals: The Application of the Theory of Differential
Association, 61 AMERICAN J. SOCIOLOGY 116 (1955).
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In sum, there has been insufficient recognition of the responsibility of
the penal law in alleviating the corrosive effects of the stigma its applica-
tion necessarily creates. Dean Joseph Lohman of the University of Cali-
fornia School of Criminology, a former sheriff of Cook County, Illinois,
has written:
There is too little concern with the stigmatizing and alienating ef-
fect of arrests of such violators [minor offenders, especially first offen-
ders]. We equate them with bank robbers and murderers. Once a
youngster has a police record, this fact, in the eyes of the law-and
potential employers-is more real than the person himself. People
stop looking at a young man. They look at his record, his "sheet" as
it is called. Over and over boys told me, "It isn't me; it's the sheet.
They won't listen to me." We have pushed these boys on the other
side of the law. They may well stay there.70
In a very real sense, the problem is one of the "self-fulfilling prophecy":
the offender initially moved toward reform becomes what we condemn him
to be. The failure of the law to treat the former offender as a person with
the potential to become a law-abiding and useful member of society, by
omitting means of removing the infamy of his social standing, deprives
him of an incentive to reform. To the extent that this shortcoming con-
tributes to the repetition of criminal conduct, it renders the system of penal
law a "monument to futility" and tends to erode public confidence in the
legal order."'
II. THE ANNULMENT OF ADULT CONvIcTIONS
To date, few jurisdictions have adopted expungement laws permitting
the annulment of conviction upon proof of reform, and, of those that have,
fewer still provide truly effective relief."2 Because so little information on
such statutes is available, a summary survey of existing laws may be helpful;
the outline below excludes statutes dealing with juvenile court adjudication,
which are discussed in part III.
70. Lohman, Upgrading Law Enforcement, 9 POLIcy 19 (1965). For psychiatric
comment to the same effect see Erickson, The Problem of Ego Identity, 4 J. AMERICAN
PSYCHOANALYTIC A. 56 (1956).
71. Correctional policy must be viewed not only in terms of its direct effect upon
criminal activity but also in terms of its effect upon other value systems of society. Cf.
BLOCH & GELs, MAN, CRIME & SocIETY 494 (1962).
72. The first offender's need for expungement has been recognized in at least two
other legal systems. Japanese law provides that after five years in the case of a minor
crime and after ten years in the case of a serious crime, the "sentence [conviction] loses
its effect" if there has been no further offense. PENAL CODE OF JAPAN, art. 34-2, 2 E.H.S.
LAw BULL. 10 (Ministry of Justice transl. 1961).
Interestingly, among the most comprehensive provisions for the cancellation of
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California: Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.45 provides that a person under the age
of twenty-one committing a misdemeanor
may petition the court for an order sealing the record of conviction
and other official records in the case, including records of arrests result-
ing in the criminal proceeding, and including records relating to other
offenses charged in the accusatory pleading, whether defendant was
acquitted or charges were dismissed.
If the order is granted, the "conviction, arrest or other proceeding shall
be deemed not to have occurred, and the petitioner may answer accordingly
any question relating to their occurrence."
The section is expressly inapplicable to traffic violations, registrable sex
offenses,"3 and narcotics violations. It seems further to be limited to persons
who (1) were not convicted on the charge they seek to have expunged, or
(2) if convicted, were eligible to have the conviction set aside under
section 1203.4 or section 1203.4a of the Penal Code (respectively, satisfac-
tory completion of probation or satisfactory completion of misdemeanor
sentence where probation was denied). It is not wholly clear whether the
relief is available to one who has had a prior conviction, though the thrust
of the less-than-pellucid language and the history of the statute would sug-
gest that it is not.7" It is also not clear just how the operation of section
1203.45 overlaps that of the "setting-aside" provisions, sections 1203.4 and
1203.4a. The latter provide for the abolition of all "penalties and disabil-
ities" resulting from a conviction; section 1203.45 does not so specify, but
the provision that the arrest or conviction shall be deemed never to have
occurred must surely include this, if the language is to have any consistency
of meaning.
Notable in this statute is the lack of any provision directing the court's
order of sealing to the attention of arresting or repository law enforcement
agencies who may have records of petitioner on file. The expungement
offense records are those of the Soviet Union. The law specifies various probationary
periods, based on the severity of the original sentence, during which there must be no
new offense. Upon cancellation of the record of conviction, the offender reverts to his
former status; the relief is not necessarily limited to first offenders. RSFSR CRIA1. CODE
art. 57, in BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE: THE RSFSR CODES 173-75
(1966). The cancellation is initiated by petition of the offender or of a social organiza-
tion, and the cause is heard by the district people's court at the offender's place of
residence. Notice must be given to the procurator, and the presence of the offender at
the hearing is apparently jurisdictional. If the petition is denied, a new petition may
not be filed for one year. RSFSR CODE OF Cium. PROCEDURE, art. 370, in BERMAN,
op. cit. supra, at 402,
73. Persons convicted of specified sex offenses are required by CAL. PEN. CODE § 290
to register with local police departments.
74. See Baum, supra note 30, at 823.
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statute relating to juvenile courts7' so provides, and experience has shown
it to be necessary, in order to give the law full effect. If one agency retains
unsealed an arrest or crime report, fingerprint card, "mug shot," or other
record naming petitioner, a check is likely to reveal it, and the expungement
will be rendered nugatory. 8 Further, section 1203.45 does not provide for
examination of records so sealed upon subsequent petition of the person
who is their subject; the juvenile court expungement statute has such a
provision." At first examination, this would seem highly anomalous, prob-
ably derogative of the intent of the enactment. It has become apparent,
however, that there may be situations in which the person who has had
his record sealed has made disclosure-such as in security clearance appli-
cations-and finds it impossible to prove that his record was in fact ex-
punged."' The order of the court sealing the records is by common practice
sealed with the other material in the case.
A further point may be noted with respect to the California enactment
which is equally applicable to the other acts discussed, save for the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency Model Act."0 Though such an action
would quite evidently be in conflict with the spirit of the act, an employer
or licensing agency is apparently able to compel a former offender to dis-
close whether he has ever sought the relief provided by the statute."
75. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 781.
76. The author was informed of a recent case in which a young man had been
granted relief under § 1203.45 following his conviction for gasoline theft. The arresting
police agency had learned of the sealing order and had closed its files, as had the
State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. However, in the particular
county where the young man was arrested, the booking of all prisoners is handled at
the county jail and separate records are kept by the sheriff's department. The booking
record reflecting the theft came to light in a record check prior to a military appoint-
ment. Because the military authorities not unnaturally raised the question of wilful
concealment of the record, the young man was in a worse position-at least until full
explanation could be given-than he would have been had no sealing order been
entered.
77. CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 781.
78. On the desirability of full disclosure of record in applications for certain critical
positions, see text accompanying note 135 infra.
79. N.C.C.D. MODEL AcT, 8 CRim & DELINQUENCY 97, 100 (1962). Of the existing
or proposed enactments found in the course of this study, only the Model Act prohibits
employers or licensing bureaus from inquiring into the fact of expungement. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1203.45 has been interpreted, however, to require any official agency with
records which have been sealed to answer any inquiry: "We have no record on the
named individual." 41 CAL. Ops. AT'y GEN. 102, 104 (1963); cf. 40 CAL. OPS.
ATr'y GEN. 50 (1962).
80. Baum, supra note 30, at 824. Several California probation officers indi-
cated to the author that they had encountered instances of such questioning, and as
expungement becomes more widely invoked one would expect the practice to spread.
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A major consideration in evaluating the effectiveness of any expungement
statute is its realistic use: does it in fact afford an accessible relief, actually
invoked, or does it simply sit as dressing upon the statute books? It is
impossible to determine the proportion of eligible offenders who utilize
section 1203.45 but there appears to be a steadily rising use of the section,
1,066 actions being received by the Department of Justice during the last
fiscal year."' Of these, 862 were reported to have been processed to com-
pletion. During the last six months of 1965, 732 such closures were com-
pleted, as compared to 243 in the period from July 1962 through June
1963. On the basis of these figures, the conclusion that the relief is relatively
accessible is not inappropriate. 2
Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(101) (Supp. 1965) provides that
any person who pleads guilty to or is convicted of not more than one
offense occurring before he is twenty-one (other than traffic violations
and crimes punishable by life imprisonment), may, when five years have
elapsed from the time of conviction, move the court to set aside judgment.
As previously indicated,8" this alone would not be considered an expunge-
ment statute without the provisions of Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.1274(102)
(Supp. 1965), which specify that upon entry of such an order vacating
judgment, the applicant shall "for purposes of the law" be deemed not to
have been previously convicted. This language is broad but has not yet been
subjected to interpretation. Insofar as this section fails to indicate the dis-
position of the records and on its face omits to cover the problem of proper
answer to inquiry, it fails as an effective expungement statute.
Under these provisions, notice must be served upon the prosecuting at-
torney, who must be given the opportunity to contest the setting aside of
the judgment. Since the statutes were enacted in 1965,8" no statistical in-
formation relative to their invocation is available.
The inquiry may take various forms, from "Have you ever had an offense record
expunged?" to "Have you ever appeared as a moving party in any court? Explain
fully." Cf. Note, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 775, 800 (1966).
81. Letter from Ronald H. Beattey, Chief, Bureau of Criminal Statistics, California
Department of Justice, to the author, January 17, 1966. The Bureau reports 2,917 actions
filed under section 1203.45 in the period from July 1962 through December 1965. Of
these, 2,379 were processed to completion and the identification files closed; in the re-
maining cases, the Bureau was unable initially to identify the defendant, and the order
had therefore to be returned with a request for more information.
82. Whether it is accessible enough, and how it might be made more accessible, is
considered in part IV below.
83. Note 16 supra.
84. Mich. Laws 1965, act 213, at 1134.
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Minnesota: Under Minn. Stat. Ann. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1965), any per-
son convicted of a crime may upon discharge from his sentence petition the
Board of Pardons for a "pardon extraordinary." This the Board may grant
if it finds that he is a first offender ("... not convicted of [any crime] other
than the act upon which [his present conviction was] founded") and
determines that he is of good character and repute. The pardon extraor-
dinary restores all civil rights and sets aside and nullifies the conviction,
"purging" the offender. The statute specifically provides that petitioner
shall never thereafter be required to disclose the conviction at any time
or place other than in subsequent judicial proceedings. Since the judicial
proceedings in which the conviction may be raised are not limited to those
in which petitioner is a defendant, it would seem that the record might be
revived for impeachment purposes in a later civil or criminal proceeding
where petitioner is a witness.
The statute does not treat the problem of police and arrest records,
fingerprint cards, and the like, and it is probable that a routine check of
enforcement agencies would turn up the fact of arrest, thus frustrating the
enactment's intended end."8
Prior to 1963, the law applied only to those under twenty-one years of
age."' There is apparently no limitation as to kind or type of offense for
which expungement may be had, although the statute has been interpreted
to be inapplicable to traffic violations.8"
The Minnesota law is distinctive in providing for expungement by ad-
ministrative action rather than judicial order. Since an effective expunge-
ment process requires the sealing of court and agency records, court action
would appear preferable.
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 164-28 (1953) permits the court to
order expungement when petitioner (1) has received a suspension of sen-
tence or a fine not exceeding $1,000 and (2) has suffered no subsequent
conviction. Ten years must elapse from the date of conviction before appli-
cation for expungement can be made, and the remedy is unavailable to per-
sons convicted of treason or misprision thereof, anarchy, any capital offense,
kidnapping, perjury, any crime involving a deadly weapon including the
carrying of such a weapon concealed, rape, seduction, aiding or concealing
persons convicted of high misdemeanors, aiding the escape of prisoners,
embracery, arson, robbery, or burglary. The petitioner must pay all costs
85. See note 76 supra.
86. In 1963, the law was extended to all first offenders regardless of age. Minn. Sess.
Laws 1963, ch. 819, at 1441-42.
87. 1949 MINN. Ops. ATT'y GFN. 328-B.
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of the expungement proceeding, and notice must be served upon the
prosecutor and police department(s) concerned. No provision is made for
the expunging or sealing of police and enforcement agency records.
The exact utility of this statute is open to much doubt. No figures as
to its invocation could be found, but the long period of time before relief
is possible (ten years) and the fairly extensive catalogue of ineligible of-
fenses restrict both the efficacy of the relief and the likelihood of its being
sought. More to the point, the statute has been construed as "lacking the
force and effect of a full pardon" (whatever that may be), apparently on
the basis that to grant the law any greater effect would be to impinge upon
the pardoning power of the governor." Since New Jersey has taken the
position that a pardon does not permit the recipient to respond in the
negative to questions about his conviction," it would seem a fortiori that a
successful petitioner under section 2A: 164-28 would also be constrained to
disclosure. In terms of restoring the essential status of the former offender,
the relief afforded by this enactment is limited at best and illusory at worst.
There is one further provision of New Jersey law upon which comment
must be made: after five years (presumably from the date of entry), the
records of "disorderly persons" on file in the office of the county clerk may
be destroyed. " This appears to be a "housekeeping" provision rather than
an enactment designed to affect the status of such "disorderly persons"-
which is doubtful, to say the least. A "disorderly person" has been defined
as one guilty of a "quasi-criminal act," something below a misdemeanor,
who is spared "the brand of being adjudged a criminal with all of its
political, business and social implications... ."91 It is hard to see how he
is so spared when he is subject to immediate arrest without process, 92 may
be summarily tried without indictment or jury,93 and may be imprisoned.4
Since "being a disorderly person" is something less than committing a crime,
such person is apparently ineligible even for the meagre relief of section
2A: 164-28. "'
88. 1951-53 N.J. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 143.
89. Id. at 206.
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:3-9(i) (Supp. 1965).
91. In re Garofone, 80 N.J. Super. 259, 271, 193 A.2d 398, 405 (1963), aff'd, 42
N.J. 244, 200 A.2d 101 (1964) (possession of barbiturates).
92. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-3 (1951).
93. In re Garofone, 80 N.J. Super. 259, 193 A.2d 398, (1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 244,
200 A.2d 101 (1964).
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-5 (1951).
95. Parenthetically, the scope of the disorderly person classification is disturbingly
broad. In one startling case, a disgruntled husband procured a revolver, jimmied the
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Texas: Though not an expungement act insofar as it fails to provide for
the destruction or sealing of records, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.13,
§ 7 (1966) deserves mention if only because it does not classify easily.
Subsection (a) provides that upon completion of probation following con-
viction of a misdemeanor, the court shall enter an order setting aside the
finding of guilt and dismissing all accusatory pleadings. By subsection (b),
the offender's finding of guilt may not be considered for any purpose (italics
in the statute) except to determine entitlement to probation in a trial for
a subsequent offense. The relief is available only to misdemeanants.
It will be noted that the statute appears to be (like the Michigan enact-
ment discussed above) simply a "setting-aside" provision, which does not
reach the status of an offender.9 However, provisions similar to subsection
(b) are not found in article 42.12, section 7, the cognate statute permitting
the setting aside of felony convictions. It is thus inferable that the legisla-
ture intended the broader relief of article 42.13, section 7 to extend to the
status itself. The section may well go farther in giving the reformed offender
protection against forced divulgence of his record to employers and licensing
agencies than would most expungement acts. The great lack of this hybrid
statute-in terms of its efficacy-lies in its failure to provide for the closure
of court and agency records.
III. EXPUNGEmENT AND THE JUVENILE COURT
A. The Need
Every state, most territories, and the United States have provided special
adjudicative and dispositive procedures in the case of juvenile offenders.
It is truistic to say that the juvenile court is not a criminal court, and that
adjudications, since not convictions, are not productive of criminal dis-
abilities. Nearly every jurisdiction so provides.9 7 All but a handful of states
screen of his long-estranged wife's bedroom with a putty knife, and shot her lover when
the latter attacked him with an axe. His argument of self-defense was denied on the
ground that by carrying implements of entry (the putty knife) and the revolver, he was a
"disorderly person" who was subject to immediate arrest, which the deceased was simply
trying to effect-with the axe. State v. Agnesi, 92 N.J.L. 53, 104 At. 299 (1918), aff'd,
92 N.J.L. 638, 106 At. 893, 108 At. 115 (1919). Just what are the bounds of "quasi-
criminality"?
96. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
97. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 378 (1958); ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1962); Amz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-228A (1956); CAL. WELFARE & INST'NS CODE § 503; COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-8-1(3), -13 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-72 (1958); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 982(b) (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2308(d) (Supp. IV, 1965); FLA.
STAT. § 39.10(3) (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2418 (1959); HAWArI Rnv. LAWs §
333-1 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1814(5) (Supp. 1965); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37,
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expressly prohibit public access to records of the juvenile court,9" and many
extend the restrictions to the files of law enforcement and social agencies."
Commonly, the fact of adjudication in juvenile court and any evidence
given in connection therewith are inadmissible against the minor in any
other court,1 and a large number of states provide that such adjudication
is no bar to future military service or public employment.1"'
§ 702-9 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT.§ 9-3215 (Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
38-801 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 208.200(5) (1962); LA. REv. STAT. § 13-1580
(1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2502(1) (1964); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 54
(1957); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 53 (1958); MICE. STAT. ANN. §
27.3178(598.1) (1962) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 242.12, 260.211(1) (Supp. 1965); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 7185-09 (Supp. 1964); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.271(1) (1959); MONT.
Rzv. CODES ANN. § 10-611 (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.190(3) (1963); N.H.
RV. STAT. ANN. § 169:26 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-39 (1951); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-8-65 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 781; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-24
(1959); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-21 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page
Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 891 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.543 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 261, 269-417 (1965); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34, § 2011
(Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-40 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1202
(1962); S.D. CODE § 43.0327 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-267 (Supp. 1965) (by
implication); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 13 (Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 55-10-105(2) (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 601, 627 (1958) (by
implication); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-179 (1950); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 2506
(1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.240 (Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
4904(83) (1961); WIs. STAT. § 48.38(1) (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-109(d)
(1957). The federal provision is found in 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1964).
98. Only Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, and Vermont appear to lack statutes explicitly
governing juvenile court records. In these states, the matter may be covered by court
rule. Cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 64 (1957). Miss. CODE ANN. § 7185-20 (1942)
prohibits divulgence of the names of minors for statistical reporting purposes, but does
not expressly protect police or court records from public inspection. MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 10-633 (Supp. 1965) limits disclosure of identity and opening of hearing to cases
where the minor is charged with a felony. See Geis, Publication of the Names of Juvenile
Felons, 23 MONT. L. REv. 141 (1961). In several states, only the probation officer's
reports are withheld from public access. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-8-66 (1953); Cf.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.321(3) (1959) (discussed pages 177-78 infra). In Ohio, the
exclusion of persons other than parents, child, or counsel of record is implicit rather than
express. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.18 (Page Supp. 1965).
99. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, 702-8(3) (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.161 (Supp.
1965); and N.Y. FAmILY CT. ACT § 784 are typical statutes requiring police department
segregation of juvenile files and prohibiting public disclosure. The Minnesota statute has
been interpreted as forbidding the furnishing of police records to governmental agencies,
at least without court order. 1965 MINN. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 268-L. A number of states
have statutes regulating the taking and transmission of fingerprints and identification
photographs in juvenile cases. See MYREN & SWANSON, POLICE WORK WITH CHLDREN
77-80 (1962).
100. On the use of juvenile court adjudication records in later adult proceedings see
Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 792 (1964); Note, 32 So. CAL. L. REv. 207 (1959).
101. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 60 (1965) (no disqualification for
public service either under the Commonwealth or in any political subdivision thereof);
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In the face of this panoply of statutory insulation to shield the youthful
offender from the criminalization that would normally attach to him, the
question must be put: are expungement procedures needed for juvenile
records, and if so, why? One may conjecture that those jurisdictions which
have provided for the annulment of adult conviction records and have
omitted such provision for juvenile adjudications-such as Alaska, Minne-
sota, and New Jersey-have done so because it was believed such protection
was unnecessary and superfluous." 2
The plain fact is that expungement provisions are necessary to effectuate
the intent of the juvenile court acts, because society does not make the fine
semantic distinctions attempted by the law. As a recent survey put it, "the
results of... [statutory classification of juvenile court records as confiden-
tial] have been so unsatisfactory that it may fairly be characterized as a
failure."1 3 In the public eye, an offender is an offender, be he juvenile or
adult. The clich6s of noncriminality and lack of stigma attendant upon
the juvenile court process'" have so often been repeated that we have
become piously obtuse to the fact that the enlightened instrumentality of
the juvenile court is frequently not as felicitous in practice as it is in
theory.105
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-105(2) (Supp. 1965) (no disqualification for any civil or
military service appointment). Several Massachusetts probation officers informed the
author that the law is ineffective as a real aid to employment because it fails to cover
private hiring. An attempt to deal with private employment would probably be in-
effective unless it restricted the scope of permissible questioning of an applicant. Some
jurisdictions expressly preserve the right to examine juvenile records when application is
made for a law enforcement position. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-9(3) (Supp.
1965).
102. Cf. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.060(e) (1962) which provides for expungement of the
record of any minor tried as an adult on a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. No
comparable provision is available for juvenile court adjudications. See also MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 242.31 (Supp. 1965).
103. Note, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 800 (1966).
104. E.g., In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 604, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954): "No sugges-
tion or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a juvenile court."
105. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 73 (1964). The problem is not limited to the
United States. In Great Britain, expungement procedures were proposed in 1960; these
were rejected by the Committee on Children and Young Persons on the ground that
there was not "a record" in the case of a juvenile delinquent, but in fact many records.
While the Committee was sympathetic to the need, it apparently felt an expungement
law would be ineffective. COMMITTEE ON CHILDREN & YOUNG PERSONS, REPORT, Cmd.
No. 1191, at 74-75 (1960-61).
In Finland, on the other hand, the law permits the "abolition" of all accusatory plead-
ings and adjudication records where a punishable offense occurred before the offender's
eighteenth birthday. D6lling, "Finnish Juvenile Penal Law" (Das Finnische Jugend-
strafrecht, Rechtd. Jugend [1961], 9/21, at 325-28), abstracted in 2 EXCERPTA CRIM-
INOLOGICA 501-02, No. 1221 (1962).
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Recognition of the stultifying effect of juvenile court adjudication was
forcefully given in the much-cited case of In re Contreras:
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication . . . [as] a
ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime,
nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, present-
ing a challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts can-
not and will not shut their eyes to everyday contemporary happenings.
It is common knowledge that such an adjudication . . . is a blight
upon the character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such
minor. Let him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or
obtain a position of honor and trust and he is immediately confronted
with his juvenile record."0 6
The considerations set forth in the preceding discussion of the adult of-
fender's plight of status apply with equal force to a juvenile. In fact, they
may thrust with more force in his case, because he may more surely be fore-
closed from the education and training needed to fit him for a useful and
productive life."0 7 As well, he may more likely be discouraged from applying
for military service." s
Additionally, there are three factors in juvenile cases which especially
compel an expungement statute reaching not only police and arrest records
but all juvenile records, including those of dependency and neglect.
First, the arrest records of the referring enforcement agencies are the
principal source of knowledge of a minor's past. Because the court records
are commonly made confidential by statute or court practice," 9 employers,
licensing agencies, and other persons seeking information usually resort to
106. 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789-90; 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952); accord, Jones v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946). In a mordant dissent
in In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 612, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954), Musmanno, J., terms the
notion that a juvenile record does its owner no lasting harm a "most disturbing fallacy"
and a "placid bromide." He colorfully describes a juvenile record as
a lengthening chain that its riveted possessor will drag after him through child-
hood, youthhood, adulthood and middle age .... It will be an ominous shadow
following his tottering steps, it will stand by his bed at night, and it wil hover
over him when he dozes fitfully in the dusk of his remaining day.
107. NUSSBAUM, FiRsT OFFENDERS, A SECOND CHANCE 4 (1956), quotes the applica-
tion form of a leading university as asking, "Have you ever been placed on probation or
parole, or had any other penalty, scholastic or disciplinary, imposed?" The application for
graduate fellowship assistance under Title IV of the National Defense Education Act
requires full reporting and certification of all crimes other than those committed before
the applicant's sixteenth birthday and minor traffic violations. U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, form OE 4149. The NDEA application, however, provides that all in-
formation will be "treated confidentially" and will be weighed "only as to the suitability
of the applicant as a ... Fellow."
108. For a discussion of military regulations see note 45 supra.
109. Note 98 supra and accompanying text.
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police files, where they all too often gain access."' 0 The effect on an adult
of arrest without conviction has already been remarked.' It is apparent
that the devastation of arrest may well be much greater in the case of a
juvenile, because the confidentiality of court records may preclude verifica-
tion of non-involvement. The inquirer is more likely to stop with the arrest
record and draw his own conclusions regarding guilt." 2 Even if the dis-
missal by the juvenile court is reflected (as it should be) upon the police
record, the observer is likely to conclude that the minor did something, at
least, and the court "let him off light."
Further, many-if not most-juvenile cases are disposed of at the police
level, without referral to juvenile court." 3 Of those that are referred, many
are "settled at intake," or are placed on informal supervision in lieu of im-
mediate adjudication. Because of widely varying practices and policies, no
meaningful national figures can be given, but California has reported that
only 42.5% of boys and 42.2% of girls referred to the juvenile courts for
delinquent acts are handled by court hearing." 4 In virtually all cases, police
arrest or contact records exist.
The second factor making the need for an expungement statute particu-
larly acute in juvenile cases is closely tied to the first: the labels or offense
designation on the police department's records (or even the juvenile court's,
for that matter) may not fairly reflect the minor's conduct. While this is
true for adult offenders, it is even more the case in juvenile matters. Not
uncommonly, the more serious of two possible crime classifications will be
selected, either in honest doubt as to which is applicable or in an effort to
make the clearance rate for the more serious offense appear higher."' There
110. Cf. Note, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 775, 785-86 (1966).
111. Note 35 supra and accompanying text.
112. Authority cited note 110 supra.
113. The F.B.I. estimates that 51.5% of all juvenile cases are settled without referral
to the court, either within the police department itself (47.29o), referral to a welfare
agency (1.6%), or referral to another police agency (2.7%). 1964 FBI UmFORt
Cruza REI,. 102 (table 13). On the informal handling of delinquents see Tappan,
Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEB. L. REv. 547 (1950).
114. CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY AND PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA 92-94
(1963).
115. A common example is the choice between "grand theft auto" (commonly a fel.
ony) and the lesser offense of "joyriding" (commonly a misdemeanor). The author was
informed by officials of the Office of Economic Opportunity on the West Coast that this
was a particularly troublesome dichotomy, since some police agencies and juvenile courts
classified all automobile thefts by minors as felonious, while others classified them as joy-
riding unless there were aggravating circumstances. The net effect of these disparate
policies is to exclude some youths from Job Corps placements while permitting the ad-
mission of others who committed precisely the same act but did so in a more lenient
jurisdiction.
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is less chance that the officer will be called in a juvenile case to account
either for his judgment or the evidence to support it.
Extreme cases, while they may make bad law, can be apt examples, and
two may serve to illustrate the point. In one case handled in 1958 by the
author as a probation officer, an eleven year old boy was placed in juvenile
hall for burglary: he had stolen a package of bologna from a grocery store
to sustain himself while running away from home, because of conflict with
his present "Uncle." The California definition of burglary technically in-
cludes entry into an open place of business with intent to steal,"' and when
the young man told the policeman he had gone into the store intending to
shoplift the meat, the officer (under some pressure from the ired shop-
keeper) concluded he was indeed a burglar. The minor was presented to
the court as a dependent child, but there nevertheless remains an appre-
hension record for burglary in the police files.
In an even more ludicrous case, the author was informed of a highly re-
spected and capable police juvenile sergeant who had contacted the juve-
nile court for assistance in shedding a record of apprehension for "child
molesting," which had occurred when he was fourteen years old. While
walking home from school with his thirteen year old inamorata, he had suc-
cumbed to his vernal urges and kissed her-in public view upon the street.
His heinous conduct was espied by the city's sole juvenile-aid-officer cum
pursuer-of-truants, and he was hustled to the police station, where appropri-
ate forms were filled out before he was sternly admonished and his parents
called. The section under which he was "charged" deals with conduct
arousing or tending to arouse the passions of a child under the age of
fourteen years!"' The arrest record remained in the police department's
files. He obviously had little trouble in obtaining public safety employment
by divulgence and explanation, but the significant point is that the record
was there, buried in some dust-covered bin, and that it turned up and
needed explanation.
Manifestly, the moral of these tales is not that outlandish results occur
in juvenile cases and that we should therefore protect their subjects. It is
rather that records of very real offenses do exist in a variety of places from
which they can be retrieved, and that without the protection of an expunge-
ment statute reaching them, the bromidic recitals of the juvenile court's
116. CAL. PEN. CODE § 459.
117. CAL. PEN. CODE § 288. The municipality in question, it may be noted in pass-
ing, seems to have displayed singular concern over the osculatory activity of its citizens.
Reportedly, it had upon its books until very recently an ancient ordinance prohibiting
any two persons from kissing unless each first wiped the lips of the other with carbolized
rose-water.
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non-punitive philosophy will not save the juvenile from the records' stigma.
The third reason underlying the especial need for expungement in juve-
nile cases is shortly stated. The distinction between delinquency and de-
pendency is blurred enough in theory and frequently not drawn at all in
fact. The public often identifies the juvenile court with delinquency and
assumes a child under its care to be an offender." 8 Further, even a status of
dependency or neglect carries its own special measure of opprobrium which
the child should not have to bear.
B. The Existing Law
In recognition of the need, a few states have enacted expungement pro-
visions of varying efficacy. As in the case of the acts applicable to criminal
convictions, some extended comparison may prove helpful.
Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 47.10.060(e) (1962) permits a minor who has been
tried as an adult after waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction to petition the
court for the sealing of his record. The petition may not be filed until the
sentence has been successfully completed and five years have elapsed. (It is
not clear whether this period is to be measured from the date of conviction
or from the date of completion of the sentence.) The petition may be made
by the Department of Health and Welfare on his behalf, and the order re-
stores all civil rights. The statute provides that no person may ever use the
records so sealed for any purpose, but is silent on the appropriate response
to questions regarding the past offense.
No comparable provision exists for actions under the juvenile court law,
and the section does not reach police records.
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-238 (1956) provides for mandatory
destruction of the court records upon the expiration of the period of
probation or after two years from the date of discharge from an institution,
unless before that time the minor has been convicted of another offense.
By implication, this relief is not available to dependent or neglected chil-
dren, and the law is silent as to the effect of the sealing. The language
("records of the proceeding") would not seem to reach police records.
California: Under Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 781, any person who
has been the subject of a petition in juvenile court or of a citation to appear
before a probation officer, or who has been taken to a probation officer,
may petition for the sealing of his records. The section does not apparently
cover the minor whose case has been concluded by the police without re-
118. REPORT OF CAL. SPECIAL STUDY COMM/x. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, pt. 1, at 19
(1960).
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ferral. The relief extends to children referred for dependency and neglect
as well as to those referred for delinquent conduct. Either the person in-
volved or the probation officer may file the petition, which cannot be done
until five years have elapsed from the termination of jurisdiction (in cases
of court disposition) or from the date of referral (in informal disposi-
tions)."' The relief is mandatory if the court finds that the petitioner has
not since been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, and has attained rehabilitation "to the satisfaction of the court."
The sealing is expressly extended to records and files in the possession of
other agencies, and the application for the order requires the applicant to
list agencies he thinks may possess records. The order is directed to each
such agency, and requires it to seal its records, advise the court of its com-
pliance with the order, and then seal the order of sealing itself."' The law
specifies that after sealing, the events shall be deemed never to have oc-
curred, and the person "may properly reply accordingly" to any inquiry.
The statute does not preclude inquiry as to the fact of expungement, nor
does it specify whether official agencies may disregard its provisions and
press for information, though its plain wording would seem to compel the
conclusion that they could not. The statute has been interpreted to require
an official agency whose files have been sealed to respond to any inquiry:
"We have no record on the named individual."' 2'
119. In a number of counties it is the practice for the probation department to offer
to file the petition for expungement. This reflects recognition of the need to make the
persons involved aware of the possibility of such action and to minimize expense and red
tape.
120. The intricacies of these provisions have not insured their uniform success, and a
number of ploys have been developed to circumvent them. In one police department sur-
veyed by the writer, the "sealing" is accomplished by stamping "sealed" upon the face
of the master index card (the so-called "alpha card") and then replacing it in the file.
Los Angeles County reportedly interprets the statute as narrowly as possible and seals
only the records of the particular offense or situation which resulted in wardship or ad-
judication as a dependent child, leaving untouched any prior or subsequent entries.
Where the case has been transferred between counties, Los Angeles county-and appar-
ently others following its lead-allegedly will not honor an expungement order from
another juvenile court, but will require the institution of new proceedings in its own
jurisdiction. (It has not been possible to verify these practices because the writer's in-
quiries to the county in question have gone unanswered.)
Upon occasion a minor is first brought to municipal court and then is certified to
juvenile court when his age is established. The author was told of two instances where
the municipal court refused at first to honor the sealing order of the juvenile (superior)
court.
The probation department personnel interviewed indicated, however, that such eva-
sive tactics are relatively rare, and from the author's observations, the general level of
cooperation has been quite high.
121. 40 CAL. Ops. ATr'Y GEN. 50 (1962).
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The statute uniquely provides that the person whose records are sealed
may at a later time petition the court to grant the right of inspection to per-
sons named in the application, apparently to effectuate security clearances
and other investigations for high-risk employment.122
Far less utilization has been made of this relief than that afforded by
Cal. Pen. Code § 1203.45 to misdemeanants under twenty-one. The records
of the Bureau of Criminal Statistics indicate that for the period July 1962-
December 1965, 791 requests for file clearance were received by the Iden-
tification Bureau; 545 were processed to completionY.12  The possibility that
this is due to a large number of juvenile referrals who become recidivists
and are ineligible does not seem to be borne out in fact; probably the best
guess is that somewhere between 60% and 85% of delinquents do not be-
come adult violators.2 4 A more plausible explanation is threefold: minors
are not as aware as more mature offenders of the possibility of expunge-
ment; they less frequently have the advice of counsel; and there is no re-
quired lapse of time before relief is possible under section 1203.45. It is
likely that by the time five years have elapsed since the jurisdiction of the
court was terminated (frequently if not typically at age eighteen) the person
involved may feel the relief is too delayed to be worth the effort.
21
Indiana: Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3215(a) (Supp. 1966) empowers the court to
order the destruction or obliteration of the record of any child adjudged a
delinquent but never committed to a public or private institution, provided
he has not been arrested for a delinquent act or "cited for any offense," is
reformed, and has been of good behavior for at least two years after judg-
ment. The order of obliteration may be made upon the court's own motion
or upon the motion of the probation officer, either with or without formal
hearing. The court, at its discretion, may order law enforcement agencies
to produce their records for destruction, and may continue the case for one
year before ruling on the motion for obliteration. The section is not applica-
ble to children handled for dependency and neglect and is silent as to the
effect of destruction.
122. Cf. text accompanying note 78 supra. Only Utah has a similar provision. See
UTAHI CODE ANN. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965) (discussed in text accompanying notes
128-31 infra).
123. See note 81 supra.
124. MATZA, op. cit supra note 105, at 22.
125. "mhe period of time that must elapse before the procedures are available is
often that in which the existence of the record is most important-the time of higher
education, military service or initial employment." Note, 79 HARv. L. Rnv. 775, 800
(1966).
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Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38-815(h) (1964) provides that when a
record is made of any public offense committed by a boy under sixteen years
of age or a girl under eighteen, the juvenile court in the county where the
record is made may order either a peace officer or a judicial officer having
such records to destroy them. A unique feature of this law is that it provides
for use of the contempt power to enforce compliance. It does not reach
dependency or neglect records, but does reach records of police agencies
even where the child was not referred to the court."' The statute requires
any person making a record to notify the juvenile court both of the fact of
the record and its substance. The law sets down no criteria for the exercise
of the court's discretion, and this is one of the most troublesome facets of
expungement acts. It must be presumed that a "standard of reformation"
guides the judge in his decision. 27
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. § 242.31 (Supp. 1965) permits the "nullify-
ing" of adjudication records if a minor is committed to the care of the
Youth Conservation Commission and discharged before the expiration of
his maximum term, or if he is placed on probation. In the former case, the
nullification is at the discretion of the court. The order of nullification has
the effect of "setting aside" the conviction and "purging the person thereof."
The conviction shall not thereafter be used against him except when "other-
wise admissible" in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The precise scope of
the section is unclear, and the relief available under it apparently overlaps
that afforded by Minn. Stat. Ann. § 638.02(2) (Supp. 1965), discussed
above.
While this enactment applies to juveniles, by its terms it does so only
upon conviction of crime. Under Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 242.12, 260.211
(Supp. 1965), juvenile court proceedings are not criminal in nature and do
not result in conviction. Thus, the anomalous conclusion is compelled that
a minor can have his record nullified only if he commits an act sufficiently
grave to warrant waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction and trial as an adult.
A fortiori, the law does not reach neglect adjudications.
The section makes no provision respecting police or other agency records,
and it is not clear whether the conviction is actually to be removed from the
judgment record.
Missouri: Though it is sometimes referred to as an expungement statute,
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.321(3) (1959) does not have the full effect of wiping
126. The Attorney General has ruled that a sheriff or county attorney cannot disclose
information from juvenile records even before expungement. See 6 KaN. L. REv. 396
(1958).
127. The difficulties in application of such a standard and the Gordian question of
who should be excluded from expungement are taken up in greater detail in part IV.
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the slate clean and should not properly be so termed. It provides that the
court may destroy, in January of each year, the social histories and informa-
tion other than the official court file pertaining to any person who has
reached the age of twenty-one. Though other subdivisions of this section
impose confidentiality on both court and law enforcement records, it is ap-
parent that the statute leaves untouched the essential adjudication of status.
Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965) permits anyone whose
case has been adjudicated in a juvenile court (seemingly including depen-
dents) to petition the court for sealing of records after one year from the
termination of court jurisdiction or release from the state industrial school.
The section provides that the court shall order the sealing if petitioner has
not since been convicted of (and does not have pending) any felony or mis-
demeanor involving moral turpitude, and if the court is satisfied as to his
rehabilitation. The language of the statute appears quite similar to that of
the California law, specifying that upon entry of the order, the proceedings
are deemed never to have occurred and the petitioner may so respond to in-
quiry. The sealing order may be extended to law enforcement records, and
subsequent inspection of records is permitted only upon request of peti-
tioner. Since the statute was enacted in 1965,128 it is too soon to assess its
effects. There is indication, however, that the courts regard the relief af-
forded by the section as exceptional, rather than viewing it as regularly to
be given absent some affirmative reason to the contrary.' 2 The latter posi-
tion is apparently taken by the California courts. 30
In some states, physical destruction of court records may be effected at
the court's discretion, but there is no indication that such destruction affects
the status or nullifies the adjudication."'
IV. Two PROPOSED LAWS AND SOmE THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
Two recently proposed acts represent especially significant attempts to
readjust the status of the reformed first offender: the New York "Amnesty
Law for First Offenders" proposed in 196512 and the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency's Model Act for the Annulment of a Conviction
128. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-117 (Supp. 1965).
129. Note, 79 HARv. L. Rlv. 775, 800.
130. Ibid.
131. Compare WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.04.230 (Supp. 1965), with VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-193 (1950). The latter permits destruction of juvenile and adult
records at the clerk's discretion, after the passage of varying periods of time depending
on the seriousness of the offense.
132. State of N.Y. Ass'y Bill, Int. No. 233 (3d Rdg. 547, Print. 5363, Rec. 703)
(1965).
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of Crime."' The two proposals adopt different means of achieving roughly
the same end. Taken in comparison, they point up three of the most press-
ing considerations of policy that must be met in constructing an expunge-
ment law: whether the relief should be automatic or a matter of discretion;
whether the record should be required to be revealed in some circumstances;
and by what means the purpose of the statute is best achieved.
The New York bill very nearly became law. After passage by both the
Assembly and Senate of New York, the act was vetoed by Governor Rocke-
feller on the ground that it was "unsound" because "too broadly con-
ceived." '3 The enactment provided for the automatic amnesty of all first
offenders--adult, youthful, or juvenile-who had not been convicted of a
felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during a "probationary
interval" immediately following completion of sentence. Before amnesty
could be granted, the offender was to file an affidavit of eligibility in the
court of original conviction." 5 The probationary period was established as
five years in the case of felony, three years in the case of misdemeanor, and
one year in the case of an adjudication as a youthful offender, wayward
minor, or juvenile delinquent." 6
The act specifically restored to the amnestied first offender his accredita-
tion as a witness, his right of franchise, his right to hold public office, and
his right to have issued or reinstated any license granted by federal, state,
or municipal authority (provided, of course, that he were otherwise quali-
fied) ."' The amnestied offender was granted the "absolute right to negate"
the fact of his arrest or conviction whenever inquiry was made by either
private persons or public authority.' All records including fingerprints,
photographs, and the like would be sealed against disclosure by the grant
133. 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 100 (1962). The Model Act was drafted in response
to recommendations of the National Conference on Parole. NATL' PROBATION & PAROLE
AsS'N, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 136 (1957).
134. New York Times, July 23, 1965, p. 1, col. 7; p. 32, col. 6. A revised version of
the bill has been introduced in the 1966 legislative session. State of N.Y. Sen. Bill, Int.
No. 1146 (Print. 1159) (1966). It removes the "automatic amnesty" provision of its
predecessor, and provides for the initiation of proceedings by a verified petition. Under
this modified bill, the petitioner would be entitled to amnesty if he "reasonably establishes"
to the court's satisfaction that amnesty "would best serve and secure his rehabilitation
and would best serve the public interest." Id. at § 91. Cf. note 147 infra and accom-
panying text. This bill was reported passed by the Senate on March 8, 1966. New York
Times, March 9, 1966, p. 30, col. 2. To avoid confusion, all references in the text are to
the 1965 bill.
135. State of N.Y. Ass'y Bill, supra note 132, at §§ 90-91.
136. Id. at § 90(6).
137. Id. at §§ 92(3)-(6).
138. Id. at 1 92(2).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
of amnesty, but express provision was made for retention, use, and disclosure
by law enforcement personnel actually engaged in investigation of crime."'
Expungement was extended to the records of persons arrested and released
without charge or acquitted after the lapse of a probationary interval of one
year. 4 ° Provision was made for acceleration of amnesty for first offenders
released on probation or parole, at the discretion of the sentencing court,'41
and the amnestied status of any first offender granted relief under the statute
was to be forfeited on subsequent offense. 142
The N.C.C.D. Model Act differs from the New York bill in several ways.
The relief of annulment of conviction is not restricted to first offenders, as it
is under the New York legislation. 43 The Model Act provides that the
order may be entered immediately upon discharge from sentence; the pro-
ceedings may be initiated either by the individual or the court. 4 ' The
granting of the relief is discretionary rather than automatic, though it is
submitted that this is a difference somewhat more illusory than real: the
New York bill in effect provided automatic issuance after the court's dis-
cretion had been exercised. It is nevertheless true that the New York ap-
proach makes the grant more a matter of right. The Model Act by implica-
tion permits the court to withhold some or all civil rights, though it provides
that the person shall be treated in all respects as if he had never suffered
conviction.
The most striking feature of the Model Act is its provision to protect the
offender whose record has been expunged from the bind of disclosure of his
past. In any application for employment, license, or "other civil right or
privilege," or in any appearance as a witness, a person may be questioned
about his previous criminal conduct only in language such as the following:
"Have you ever been arrested for or convicted of a crime which has not
been annulled by a court?"' 45 This approach to the very difficult balance
of disclosure against denial has not been adopted in any existing enactment,
and seems eminently sound. As will be later discussed, it lends itself to the
solution of the problem of high-risk employment."0 To date, no jurisdiction
has adopted the Model Act.
139. Id. at § 93.
140. Id. at § 99.
141. Id. at §§ 97, 98.
142. Id. at § 95. Enforcement of the bill was vested in the State Commission for
Human Rights, and specific penalties were provided for violation of its provisions. Id. at
§ 94.
143. 8 CRImF & DELINQUENCY 100 (1962).
144. Ibid. Presumably, the offender would be required to file a petition in either
case.
145. Ibid.
146. See p. 183 infra.
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In vetoing the New York bill, the Governor remarked its failure to dis-
tinguish among the various grades of crime, and its apparent grant of relief
regardless of the individual's efforts at rehabilitation. 4 In part, these criti-
cisms are pertinent; in part, they miss the mark of the bill. A significant
aspect of the bill was its express reservation to the court of the power to
deny amnesty in the case of a "dangerous offender," defined as one deemed
by the court "to be suffering from a serious personality disorder indicating
a marked propensity towards continuing criminal conduct or activity." '48
For the realistic protection of the community, such a provision is indispensa-
ble, and this standard of classification seems far preferable to differentiation
on the basis of felony versus misdemeanor, or even on the basis of crimes
against person versus crimes against property. The young man who, on
impulse, attempts to hold up a candy store with a toy pistol and is charged
with armed robbery may be far less a menace to the community's safety than
the would-be cat burglar who sets out to "hot prowl" an apartment, is
found loitering on the rear stairs under suspicious circumstances, and is
charged with disorderly conduct (very likely on the agreement that he will
"cop a plea"). Under the usual grade-of-crime standard, the former would
(it is assumed) be ineligible for amnesty or expungement, and the latter
would be qualified.
Manifestly, some safeguard must be built into an expungement statute
against the erasure of criminal records in improper cases, but the safeguard
must be grounded on rational criteria. The vice of the "dangerous of-
fender" standard adopted by the New York bill is in its vagueness, but
therein may be precisely its strength as well. The legislature cannot fix with
exactness every case that it wishes to exclude from the operation of the law.
If the law is to work realistically and effectively, the enactment must enun-
date the standard and leave its application to the courts.
In the author's view, the yardstick of the "dangerous offender" as a
measure of exclusion would be improved by eliminating the "serious per-
sonality disorder" term and expanding the "clear and present danger" test
embodied in the standard of "marked propensity towards continuing crim-
inal conduct." The test of serious personality disorder requires a finding
that the trial court is ill-equipped to make, at least without more effective
psychiatric assistance than is presently available. The expansion of the
standard of clear and present danger to the community would require that
the court be empowered, in the case of specified serious crimes (murder,
forcible rape, vicious assaults, and the like), to find the person a "dangerous
147. New York Times, July 23, 1965, supra note 134.
148. State of N.Y. Ass'y Bill, supra note 132, at § 90(2).
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offender" ineligible for expungement simply on the gravity of the offense,
without specific finding on the likelihood of further criminality.
Such a standard would permit a more realistic discrimination between
offenses than can be gained by the use of a felony-misdemeanor formula.
Practically speaking, the likelihood of a person committing a crime of such
serious magnitude seeking expungement seems small.
The assertion that the New York bill granted expungement without re-
gard to rehabilitative effort is chimerical and overlooks the presumption
obviously indulged in by the legislature; i.e., that if the person has com-
pleted the probationary interval without conviction, he has in fact made
efforts toward rehabilitation. If the requirement were added that the judge
could not grant expungement without a finding of "sincere effort toward
rehabilitation," by what other criteria would this be measured and by what
other evidence could it be proved? Surely the best evidence of rehabilitative
effort is the avoidance of future criminality.
Two examples are frequently chosen to illustrate the unrealistic "do-
gooder" spirit and visionary blindness to danger often claimed for those who
advocate expungement statutes: the embezzler could deny his past in seek-
ing a position at a bank, and a school teacher could conceal a sex offense.
These illustrations of the breadth of the proposed New York law were used
by Governor Rockefeller, and the point is by no means invalid. There is no
easy answer to it. What it comes to is this: are we willing to run the risk of
the embezzler's resumption of his larcenous habits in return for the oppor-
tunity to restore a very large number of persons to a useful social state? The
risk of the repetition of the school teacher's offense upon one of his charges?
Surely it is immediately apparent that these risks are of vastly different
magnitude and cannot be singly answered. In order to have any sensible
assessment of the risk, the offense cannot be viewed in vacuo, but only in
terms of the individual who committed the offense and the circumstances
in which he committed it. It is precisely here that the "dangerous offender"
discretion of the court is essential.
Beyond this, however, is another consideration: we cannot lose sight of
overriding values society wishes-and needs-to protect. We value so highly
the sacrosanctity of the child's person that we may very well wish to pre-
clude a former sex offender from again dealing with children, on the off
chance that he may reoffend. The possibility of serious harm is too great,
though the probability of reoffense might be small. By the same token, the
harm caused by a repetition of embezzlement is more easily insured against
and more easily borne, and this risk we may wish to assume.
As a matter of policy in view of the risk, we may deem it necessary to bar
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a prior offender from police employment because he may be unable to with-
stand the stresses of his position; the risks to the public from his defalcation
are too great. (But again, the risk cannot be intelligently weighed in ab-
straction from the offense and the offender. Some of the most compassion-
ate and effective policemen of the author's acquaintance have had rather
besmirched pasts. Lacking any sure calculus of risk, we are remitted to the
sound and understanding discretion of the hiring agency, and it would seem
necessary to have full disclosure.) To require a former offender to divulge
his past offense in seeking police employment is not to say that he cannot
reform, or even that he will likely reoffend. It is rather to say that by his
past difficulty, he has indicated possible instability and lack of judgment,
and the appointing authority must be made aware of the risk before it places
him in a position requiring coolness of head and firmness of self-control to
accompany the loaded sidearm. This is a very different thing from forever
holding him a social outcast because of his past.
Even greater risks exist in the area of the national security and defense,
and here too full disclosure seems essential. Consider the position of an air-
man charged with responsibility for a missile or other vastly lethal piece of
modem armament. To prevent an unauthorized detonation or launch, it
is imperative that the personnel chosen for control operate at a continued
high level of reliability. Those who are possibly unreliable must be ex-
cluded." ' Since a prior unlawful act may be indicative of an impulsive
character, and an individual who possibly could not cope with the tremen-
dous pressures of such an assignment, its commission must be divulged.
The antagonistic desiderata of abolition of record on the one hand and
required revelation of it in particular circumstances on the other are not as
irreconcilable as they seem. If an expungement statute only authorizes a
response denying any record, it fails to meet the problem and throws the
whole matter upon the person whose record is expunged. Per contra, if the
statute adopts the "limitation on inquiry" mode of the Model Act, it is
possible not only to permit the regenerate offender to take advantage of his
new status, but also to protect the overriding interests of public security.
This might feasibly be done with provisos, excepting from the limited
inquiry enjoined by the statute any cases where the person granted expunge-
ment makes application (for example) for a position involving the super-
vision of children, for a position in law enforcement, or for a position
149. On the compelling need for personal stability in a "dispenser of lethal power"
ae U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, Guidance for Implementing the Human Re-
liability Program, AFM 160-55 (1962), in KATz, GOLDSTEIN & DmRSHowrrZ, MATERIALS
ON PSYCHOANALYSIS & LAW 577-92 (5th temp. mlimeo. ed. 1965) (cited with permission
of the authors).
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sensitive in terms of national security. The use of the limited inquiry would
do much to facilitate employment and would eliminate the circumvention
of the expungement order save in the few excepted cases.
The contrast of the New York bill and the Model Act is instructive in rais-
ing another difficult point: should expungement be wholly automatic, man-
datory upon fulfillment of the prescribed conditions as the New York bill
sought to make it; or wholly discretionary, as the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency recommends?.. Bluntly put, if the grant of ex-
pungement is wholly automatic, some will get it who should not; if it is
wholly discretionary, some will not get it who should have it. Closely tied
to this problem is another desideratum: effective accessibility. Considera-
tion of the latter issue may help to illumine the former.
It makes no sense whatever to provide statutory means for redefinition of
status and then surround their utilization with such procedural obstacles
that they are not invoked. Really, the problem is twofold: the reformed
offender must be made aware of the remedy (else its incentive value is lost),
and he must be able to invoke it with a minimum of difficulty. Quite simi-
lar to the expungement problem is the matter of restoring competency fol-
lowing discharge from hospitalization for mental illness, and experience
with such procedures is of significance to this inquiry.
A recent study in the District of Columbia compared the means there
available for restoration: automatic restoration on certificate of discharge
from the hospital superintendent, and petition for restoration upon con-
ditional release.151 Of 329 persons studied, 327 were "officially restored" to
competency by certificate (mandatory on discharge as cured). Only one
had gained restoration by petition following conditional release. One other
person had filed an application, but after six months it had not been pro-
cessed. The study concluded that although the precise reasons for the ex-
tremely small number of applications for restoration on conditional release
were unknown, "lack of knowledge of the necessity for taking such action is
probably a factor.""5 2
On the other hand, the California statistics on the invocation of the
youthful offender expungement statute153 suggest that requiring the offender
to petition for the relief does not necessarily deter him from procuring it.
His awareness of the existence of expungement and the means of achieving
150. 8 Cnzmn & DELINQUENCY, 99 (1962).
151. Zenoff, Civil Incompetency in the District of Columbia, 32 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv.
243 (1963).
152. Id. at 249.
153. CAL. PEN. CoDn § 1203.45. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
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it, and his expectation that it may be gained without undue trouble, hu-
miliation, and time, would seem far more significant factors.
Typically, the reformed offender may hold a dim view of the law and its
processes, and be chary of invoking their aid. On the other hand, he has
committed an offense, and it is surely not unreasonable to expect him to take
some steps to initiate the process of expungement. It will be recalled that
even the "automatic" New York act required the offender to commence the
amnesty by filing an affidavit. The procedures necessary should be kept to
a high degree of simplicity and a low degree of cost. It would not be in-
appropriate to permit the court to hold the hearing informally, in chambers,
after appropriate notice to the agencies involved.
A satisfactory resolution of these points can be reached if the court is
required to inform the first offender at the time of imposition of sentence of
the possibility of expungement. Notice should be included in any copy of
the sentence order given him. At the termination of his sentence, a letter
informing him of the availability of the expungement remedy and of the
probationary interval should be sent by the clerk of the court to his last
known address. It would seem desirable to have the probation department
assist in the preparation of the simple petition and any necessary supporting
documents, and the offender should be informed of this in the clerk's
letter and instructed to contact the probation department for assistance." 4
The statute authorizing the expungement should be mandatory rather
than directory; that is, the court should be required to order expungement
if the person has not suffered further conviction during the probationary
interval unless the court finds strong affirmative cause to deny it (a finding
that the person is a "dangerous offender"). In that sense, the process should
be "automatic," and the filing of a simple request with a supporting docu-
ment should be prima facie entitlement to expungement.
For yet another reason it seems wise to the writer to require that the
offender initiate the proceedings, and that is the reason of incentive. As
this paper has attempted to show, our penal law, in its present state, is
one-sided, providing only negative motivation for reform-the avoidance of
future incarceration.' If the offender is provided with a positive stimulus
154. While this suggestion might seem unrealistic in view of the fact that probation
departments are often overworked and understaffed, it must be pointed out that the
required documents are very largely pro forma and the task is essentially a clerical one.
Pre-printed petition and affidavit forms may be helpful. The restoration of the reformed
offender to his place in society is the goal of any probation program, and the specialized
skills of probation personnel would seem particularly useful in assisting the eligible
former offender to avail himself of the relief. The availability of expungement can be a
powerful asset in a casework plan.
155. Professor Gresham Sykes has aptly pointed out that the system of punishment
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and is given an initiating role in the process by which the readjustment of
status is achieved, it is likely that he will regard it as more meaningful.'5 0
As a means of social control, reward for achievement of the conduct which
punishment was designed to attain is more effective than punishment
alone."' If the transgressor is forgiven by the law as he was condemned by
it, he may hold the legal process in better esteem and be less impelled to
violate its dictates.' 8
Since the expungement procedure here proposed requires a certain dis-
cretion and since the sealing process should extend to agency records, it
is preferable that it be a matter of judicial order rather than administrative
direction. The court is likely more accessible than an administrative body
and its power is better known." 9 The National Council on Crime and De-
linquency has concluded that authorization of expungement by judicial
order should produce wider and more uniform invocation of the power,
while allowing for sound discretion to take individual circumstances into
account. 6 The regular purgation of police department files is desirable
from several standpoints,'61 but for the foregoing reasons it seems unwise
to expect that expungement can be accomplished by such agency action
alone.
V. A SUMMING-UP
Creating a "model" statute is more often a matter of conjury than of
construction, and it will not be attempted here. However, as a starting
point for future discussion, it may be useful to summarize the requisites of
an effective expungement statute and some of the means by which those
requisites are most likely to be achieved, and to add a few interstitial
remarks.
implies a scheme of reward, and that it is precisely upon this point that our system of
penal law founders-at least from the point of view of the individual it seeks to control.
Though he spoke in particular of the prison and its administration, his remarks are
germane to the correctional law as a whole. Syxas, THE SOCIETY oF CAPTIVES 50-52
(1958). t P
156. Cf. Goldstei, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visi-
bility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 590-92 (1960).
157. Cf. MANNHEIM, MAN AND SOCIETY IN AN AoE or RECONSTRUCTION 281-83
(1940). This observation assumes the point that we punish with a purpose of re-
habilitation, and not solely to satisfy our urge for vengeance.
158. Professor Matza observes that delinquency is facilitated when the "moral bind
of the law is neutralized." MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DPIFT 98 (1964). A sense of
injustice (ie., that even if 'one reforms, one will not be forgiven and cannot rid oneself
of the stigma of the crime) supports the processes by which the neutralization occurs.
159. 8 CrmE & DELINQUENCY 99 (1962).
160. Ibid. The same conclusion was reached by the commentators to the Model
Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.05, comment at 30-31 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).
- - .161. MYREN & SWANSON, POLICE WORX 'Wrru CHILDREN 79 (1962).
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If it is to serve its purpose, the action of expungement should be complete,
accessible, realistic, and at least acceptable to the public taste. To that
end, the following observations are offered.
(1) The expungement of the adjudication of guilt of a juvenile de-
linquent or an adult first offender should be made mandatory, upon petition
of the offender, if the court finds that he has not reoffended, unless strong
affirmative reason exists for denial. The court should have the power to
deny expungement upon a finding that the person is a "dangerous offender,"
either because there is a likelihood of further criminal conduct or because
the offense was sufficiently grave. A judgment denying expungement
should be made appealable.
(2) A probationary interval following the completion of sentence as a
precondition to expungement is a wise precaution. There is no magic in
a metric of time, but what we are seeking is the man who can remain
stable in his community life without the need even of minimal correctional
restraint or supervision. He must be able to succeed "on his own," and
expungement immediately upon discharge seems ill-conceived.
Unfortunately, there is evidently no period of time beyond which social
scientists can say there is any given likelihood that the offender will not
reoffend, and so we must strike a balance of common sense. An apt selec-
tion would seem to be two years (after termination of supervision) in the
case of a juvenile delinquent or in the case of a misdemeanor, and five
years in the case of a felony, with the court empowered to accelerate the
expungement in its discretion. Whatever time selected should not be so
long as to render the relief useless. (In the case of a dependency or neglect
adjudication in the juvenile court, expungement should be made available
immediately upon attainment of majority.)
(3) The expungement statute (or statutes) should include juvenile and
adult offenders, and extend as well to dependent children of the court.
On the juvenile court level, expungement should not be limited to first
offenders, since a minor may commit a number of misdeeds before
"straightening out" through maturation.
(4) At both adult and juvenile levels, the statute should reach not only
the officially adjudicated case but cases of arrest-release and cases of acquit-
tal as well. It should extend the order of sealing to all law enforcement and
other agency records, including those in cases disposed of intra muros. Be-
cause the petitioner may wish to permit limited inspection of the records at a
later time-for example, in making application for a security-critical job-
the statute should provide for sealing rather than destruction of the records.
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Records so sealed should be required to be removed from the main or
master file and kept separately.
The widespread dissemination of records is an aid to effective law enforce-
ment, but it poses a problem for effective expungement. The order of
sealing should be directed to each enforcement agency having a record of
the petitioner, and should be sent as well to all central indices and reposi-
tories. As one commentator has put it: "It seems that when the Moving
Finger writes these days, a dozen Xerox copies likely are made."'' In
this respect, consideration must be given to records and identification data
forwarded by the police department to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
These submitted materials are considered by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation to be the property of the transmitting agency, which must author-
ize any changes or deletions. 6 ' When a card reporting an arrest is returned
to the contributor at the latter's request, the arrest entry is deleted from
the individual's identification record at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Therefore, the order of expungement should direct the local enforcement
agency to request the return of any transmitted records.
Provision should be made for certification of compliance by the agencies
named in the order, and, upon receipt of the certifications, the judgment
reciting the order of sealing should itself be sealed, to remove any chance
of unauthorized public access.
(5) The statute should expressly set forth the effects of the order in
restoring the civil rights of the redeemed offender, and it should expressly
annul the conviction and the offense. In addition to specifying that the
person will thereafter be regarded as never having offended, it should pro-
vide that in all cases of employment, application for license or other civil
privilege, examination as a witness, and the like, the person may be ques-
tioned only with respect to arrests or convictions not annulled or expunged.
Exceptions should be set out in cases of high-risk employment where very
great interests are at stake, such as law enforcement positions and those
directly involving the national security.
The adoption of the "limited inquiry" provision will do more than en-
able the accommodation of the conflicting needs of the individual and
the overriding public good; it will remove much of the public objection to
162. Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 816, 824
(1965).
163. Information on the policy of the F.B.I. regarding submitted records was ob-
tained from identification division administrators in Washington, D.C., through the help
of special agents of the San Jose, California, field office. The author gratefully ar
knowledges their assistance.
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EXPUNGEMENT OF ADJUDICATION RECORDS
this type of statute In commending Governor Rockefeller's veto of the
New York bill, the District Attorney of Manhattan is reported to have
said that the bill was unrealistic because "it permitted a person to lie about
his former conflict with the law."' " It is perhaps hard to articulate but
there is-to the writer's mind, at least-something objectionable about
legalized prevarication even though one can rationalize the point by the
worthiness of the end. It impairs the law's integrity by creating a fiction
where none is needed. To only allow the offender to deny his offense leaves
the burden on him; to restrict the questioning about his offense places the
focus where it belongs, on the attitudes of society.'65
(6) Because of the differences in kind and the overwhelming need for
records in the control of thoughtless and irresponsible drivers, the privilege
of expungement should not be extended to traffic offenses. Moreover, these
violations are regarded by society in an entirely different light than the
usual order of crimes and leave no such residue of stigma; hence, there
is no compelling need for their inclusion in the scope of an expungement
provision.
(7) The statute should provide that upon subsequent conviction, the
expunged record of an adult violator may be considered by the court for
the purposes of sentencing or appropriate disposition.
In conclusion, most offenders do not remain criminals all their lives, and
we should not treat them as if they do. It is manifestly not the purpose
of the penal law to ascribe permanent criminality to a first offender, though
that is largely its effect. 6 This article is not intended as a panegyric for
a soft-headed penology. It is rather an attempt to point up a serious flaw in
164. New York Times, July 23, 1965, p. 1, col. 7; p. 32, col. 6. The objection that
expungement and vacation of conviction laws permit the "rewriting of history" is fre-
quently raised. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.05, comment at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1957).
165. The adoption of a "limited inquiry" rule does not solve all the former offender's
employment problems or insure that the employer will not discern the offense. It
merely blocks the route of direct inquiry, and its virtue in so doing is that it makes
much more clear the spirit of the statute by cutting off the main source of forced dis-
closure. Total compliance with that spirit can never be assured, and employers will be
able to learn by indirection what they cannot learn directly. Customarily, inquiry is
made about past employment; personnel officials desire to know when, where and why
no longer. Thus, an employment gap because of a jail sentence may be all too apparent.
While questioning of this kind can allow the employer to evade the statute's intended
end, it is neither realistic nor desirable to attempt to foreclose all questioning about past
work. The "limited inquiry" mode can substantially reduce the potential for forced
disclosure of offense, but it cannot wholly eliminate it.
166. People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315, 327, 199 N.E. 495, 499 (1936).
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our present legal system: the failure to provide means for redefining the
status of the rehabilitated transgressor. It is submitted that an expunge-
ment process will not serve to hamper effective law enforcement, but will
stand as an adjuvant to the goal of the correctional law. It should provide
a potent incentive to reformation, and should render our response to
criminality less febrile and more effectual. At the very least, it is deserving
of serious trial.
We would do well to bear in mind that
it is a legal principle that correctional law is forgiving. Forgiveness is
part and parcel of rehabilitation, whether of criminals or anyone else
who has erred, or who has, in fact, what all of us have-the defects of
being human.167
167. RuBiN et al. at 694.
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